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ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS ON LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS
NORMAN N. MINTZt
The nationalization of foreign property, the claims arising there-
from, and the settlement of such claims are subjects which lend them-
selves to economic, as well as legal, analysis. Reflection will show that
the raw material of the claims-the valuation of nationalized property-
is well within the purview of the economist, as is the kind of cost versus
benefit analysis which is the basis for qualitative statements about the
appropriateness of specific settlements. This Article, however, makes no
attempt to treat comprehensively the economics of nationalization. Rather,
certain economic aspects of claims settlements will be discussed from
the point of view of the claimant country,' and certain specific United
States and United Kingdom lump sum agreements with Eastern Europe-
an countries will be examined in terms of the previous discussion and
relevant available data.'
Valuation
There are three conventional methods of valuing property: the
first is to turn to the market for something that is optimistically called
"fair" market value; the second is to apply some rate of discount to the
flow of earnings expected from a given asset; and the third is to calculate
the replacement cost of property. None of these approaches is a perfectly
satisfactory method of valuing property which is converted involuntarily.
The reasons for this can be easily shown.
A good is valued properly by the market only if certain rather
stringent conditions are met. The market must have a very large number
of buyers and sellers, any buyer must be able to acquire any quantity he
desires, and any seller must be able to dispose of any quantity he wishes
at the market price. Each unit of the commodity traded in the market
must be perfectly substitutable for any other unit of the commodity. All
tAssistant Professor of Finance, Syracuse University.
1. For an excellent appraisal of the benefits of expropriation to the expropriating
country see Bronfenbrenner, The Appeal of Confiscation in Economic Development,
3 Eco OmIc DEVELOPMENT & CULTURAL CHANGE 201 (1955).
2. This article pursues, in another frane of reference, the position taken in
Lillich, International Claims: Their Settlement by Lump Sum Agreements, in INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRAIno LiBER AMIcORUm FOR MIARTI DomxE 143, 146-51 (P. Sanders
ed. 1967).
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traders in the market must have perfect knowledge of the market at all
times. The market must be free from external controls and internal
combinations or consortiums.' If these conditions are met, then prob-
lems associated with valuation evaporate. One whose property is con-
fiscated at the market price can simply replace his property in the market.
Since all units of the commodity are perfectly substitutable, he will be
indifferent as to whether he owns his previous property or the newly
acquired property. Under such conditions, if full compensation for nation-
alized property is offered, nationalization is superfluous.
In the case of commodities which are more or less unique, such as
real estate or factories, the going market price is the price which the
last seller was willing to accept and the last buyer willing to pay. All
sellers (buyers), then, have subjectively valued their product at or
below (above) the current market price. All owners (demanders) of
similar commodities who have not sold (bought) at that price pre-
sumably value their product at a higher (lower) price. It is dear, then,
that the market price is a fair price to only a small minority of participants
in the market; for the remainder it is either too high or too low. Specif-
ically, the market price is too low a price for any owner of property,
because if the market price were acceptable to him, he would no longer
be an owner.
It must be remembered that money in problems of valuation is only
a numeraire which permits comparisons to be made among a very large
number of possible assortments of goods. Thus, the payment of a certain
price for a given good implies a subjective comparison by the buyer
between that good and any other combination of goods which he could
obtain for the same amount of money. What is being measured ultimately
is the subjective utility of the good to the buyer and seller. The oppor-
tunity cost, or price, of any good to its owner is the most attractive (to
him) collection of other goods which he has foregone in order to main-
tain ownership of his present property.
Nor is the market price in this case an average, in any sense, of the
opinions of potential buyers and sellers of property.4 It is only that price
at which the last transaction took place. It follows, then, that the proper
price to pay one who is forced to sell his property, i.e., the price which
fully compensates him for the loss of the use of his assets, is only that
price at which he would be willing to sell. The amount of payment which
fulfills this criterion depends, therefore, not only on the specific property
3. Cf. J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMic THEORY, A MATHEMiATICAL
APPROACH 86-87 (1958).
4. Since the shape of the demand and supply functions are not likely to be
symmetrical, the sum of the curves will not be a horizontal straight line intercepting the
Y axis at the current price, which is implied by suggesting price as an average.
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involved, but on the individual or firm which owns the property.
The use of discounted earnings to determine the value of a given
asset is similarly subject to considerable uncertainty. The application of
a discounted earnings formula to the valuation of property implies a
certain knowledge of future earnings, and knowledge of the specific
rate at which to discount these earnings.' It is clearly impossible to know
in any absolute sense the earnings which an asset will yield in the future.
Rather, all that can be ascertained is a subjective probability distribution
of anticipated future earnings. This distribution, and thus the expected
value of earnings, will differ from individual to individual and from
firm to firm, and so the level of earnings which are to be discounted will
again vary depending on the owner of the asset nationalized.
Further, there is little agreement on the appropriate rate at which
to discount these earnings. This rate, ideally, should be the cost of
capital to the owner of the asset, which in turn is a proxy for the highest
return which the owner could expect to obtain by using his capital in
some other way. Attempts to measure a firm's cost of capital have
been only partly successful; determination of the opportunity cost of an
investment brings one back to the problem of estimating the flow of
future earnings from the substituted project.6 Then the discounted
returns method, too, yields only a rough estimate of the value of property.
Moreover, it is an estimate about which reasonable men can, and often
do, differ.
The use of replacement cost less depreciation to determine the
value of an asset is subject to another sort of error. It is possible that
replacement cost and economic worth may diverge considerably. To
illustrate, the Cunard Line recently disposed of the Queen Mary for a
token amount because the ship was uneconomic to operate. Yet the
replacement cost of the Queen Mary would clearly be enormous.
It is clear, then, that a single and unquestionable value for a given
asset cannot be determined. Rather, the owner of the property and the
nationalizing government are likely to differ substantially on the pro-
perty's value. The question of valuation is likely to be negotiated in the
same way that other conditions of compensation are negotiated. It is
notable that the estimates of the value of nationalized property are likely
to affect the negotiating posture of the parties involved in a specific
claim. If the nationalizing country values the property at 100 and the
claimant country at 150, a settlement of 90 may leave the negotiators for
the latter convinced that they have been dealt with harshly and the
5. See A. ROBICHEK & S. MYERS, 0 PTImAL FINANcING DECISIONS 9-11, 67-93
(1965).
6. Id. 64.
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negotiators for the former with the feeling that they have been generous.
In a sense, both sides can be right.
Concessions
It is frequently the case that a government negotiating a claims
settlement on behalf of its nationals is constrained to make economic or
political concessions in order to obtain a satisfactory settlement. When
economic concessions are clearly resultant from the claims settlement,
their cost may be readily determined providing sufficient data exists.
Political concessions are more difficult to evaluate economically, both
for theoretical reasons and because reliable data tends to be scarce.
Other times, both economic and political concessions may follow, but not
be caused by, a specific claims settlement. In such cases, unless an
investigator is privy to the actual negotiations, he may fall into the
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy or, indeed, completely overlook actual
concessions.
The Realization of Payment
A major economic concern about the payment of lump sum settle-
ments for the confiscation of property, reparations, or other form of
payments by the government of one country to the government of an-
other, is the question of whether such money settlements result in a trans-
fer of real assets from the paying country to the receiving country. In
this connection, real assets are defined as tangible goods and services;
financial assets, on the other hand, consist of claims, presumably entitling
the holder to real goods and services at some time in the future.
An economist's concern with real transfers derives from the fact
that, in order for domestically owned property to exist abroad, domestic
residents, either private or corporate, must have given up some part of
their potential consumption of goods and services. Assuming balance in
international payments, money invested in a foreign country will result
in either exports from, or foreign investment in, the home country.
That is, the funds acquired by foreigners as a result of investment
abroad will be spent on goods which will be physically removed from
the home country (imports), on goods which will be left in the home
country (direct investment), or on securities of home country issuers
(portfolio investment). If the latter is the case, the home country has
undertaken an obligation to provide the security holders with real goods
and services at some time in the future. In this sense, there is little
difference between foreigners holding domestic money (liabilities of the
7. R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIM S: THEIR ADjUDICATION By NATIONAL
COMMISSIONS 107-09 (1962).
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government or commercial banks) and securities (liabilities of private
issuers). Equity securities can be considered either as a claim on the
issuing corporation or as ownership of part of the assets of the cor-
poration; it makes no difference for the purposes of this analysis. If, then,
a foreign government takes property owned by nationals of another
country, it is important to ascertain whether the claimant country will
recoup that quantity, or at least some quantity, of the goods and services
which it gave up to obtain the foreign investment, or which it has
pledged to give up in the future.
Most of the work which has been done in this area8 attempts to
determine the effects which will occur in two economies, both of which
are relatively free of overt economic controls, if the first pays to the
second a sum of money, and the extent to which such payment of money
will cause, in and of itself, a transfer of the real resources mentioned
above. The transfer of real resources is assumed to take place as a result
of the changes in prices and income in both the paying and receiving
economy, which, in turn, result from the initial monetary transfer. In
general terms, the increase (decrease) in the money supply of the
recipient (paying) country will cause an increase (decrease) in incomes
and prices in that country. The higher (lower) domestic prices coupled
with higher (lower) incomes will cause an increase (decrease) in
imports, or a decrease (increase) in exports. This change in the balance
of trade will cause increased (decreased) payments to foreigners, which
will reduce (increase) the domestic money supply income level, and bring
the balance of trade back to the pre-transfer level. The money payment
will thus be replaced by a transfer of goods.
In the case of transfers from controlled to uncontrolled economies,
however, this process is likely to be subverted. Controlled economies are
likely to offer for export only governmentally approved categories of
goods at fixed prices and in fixed quantities. These goods are offered in
order to obtain only that quantity of hard currency necessary to pay
for desired imports; such an economy is more likely to run an import
surplus than an export surplus, i.e., it is likely to solicit grants or loans
sufficient to enable its consumption to exceed its production of real
goods and services.
Such a program was most clearly exemplified by the economic
exploitation of the Balkan nations by Germany in the 1930's. Germany,
paying high prices in terms of Balkan currencies, purchased large
8. See, e.g., R. KucYNsra, AMERICAN LOANS TO GERMANY (1927); F. MACHLUP,
INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS, DEBTS, AND GOLD chs. xv- (1964); Keynes, The German
Transfer Problem, 39 ECONoMIc J. 1-7 (1929) ; Metzler, The Transfer Problem Recon-
sidered, 50 J. POLITICAL ECONOMY 397-414 (1942); Ohlin, The Reparation Problem:
A Discussion, 39 ECONOMIC J. 172-73 (1929).
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quantities of raw materials from the Balkan countries. Pressure by the
export interests of these countries induced the Balkan central banks to
finance the increased exports and thus the banks acquired large claims on
Germany. Germany, however, limited her own exports to only a few
sorts of goods particularly those which would not hamper her rearma-
ment activities. This fact accounts for the Balkan states' being flooded
with aspirin and harmonicas during the middle 1930's.'
ii
The remainder of this Article consists of a brief effort to evaluate the
effectiveness of achieving real transfers through the lump sum settlement
of claims against communist countries by the United States and the
United Kingdom. Six such settlements,"0 the official exchanges of notes
following these treaties, and such data as is available relating to the
bilateral balance of payments of the United States and the United King-
dom with Bulgaria, Poland, and Rumania for a period of years before
and after the agreements have been examined. No attempt has been made
to determine the methods used to value the many separate items in each
of these settlements or how alternative assumptions about claimants,
expected return, or appropriate discount might have affected the amount
of final claims. 1
From consideration of the data now available, and in light of the
brief discussion of the theory of transfer payments outlined above, no
strong reason appears for favoring the British over the American method
of settling claims, i.e., the tying of the size of installments to annual
imports from the paying country rather than the outright specification
of the size of annual installments. This is not to say that the United
States may not lose a bargaining advantage by not following the British
formula; she probably does. Further, this is not to suggest that the
United States makes fewer concessions than the United Kingdom in
negotiating these settlements; foreign aid tendered Poland upon the
conclusion of the lump sum settlement with that country suggests that,
in at least one case, the net payments were to, rather than from, the
9. See C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL EcoNomics 292-93 (3d ed. 1963).
10. Agreement with Bulgaria, July 2, 1963, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S. No.
5387; Agreement with Poland, July 16, 1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 4545;Agreement with Rumania, March 30, 1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 317, T.I.A.S. No. 4451;
Agreement between Great Britain and Rumania, Nov. 10, 1960, C~mN. No. 1232(T.S. No. 82 of 1960), 385 U.N.T.S. 113; Agreement between Great Britain andBulgaria, Sept. 22, 1955, Cam. No. 9625 (T.S. No. 79 of 1955), 222 U.N.T.S. 349;
Agreement between Great Britain and Poland, Nov. 11, 1954, C,D. No. 9343 (T.S.
No. 77 of 1954), 204 U.N.T.S. 137.
11. These problems might prove to be fruitful fields for further inquiry should
the relevant data become available.
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communist country. 12 The probability of achieving a real transfer equal
to the sum of money that is finally to be paid, however, is as great under
the United States formula as under the United Kingdom system. An
examination of the individual agreements will clarify this observation.
In the United States-Bulgaria Agreement it is provided that, of the
3,543,398 dollars which constituted the United States claim, 3,143,398
dollars was to be paid from the liquidation of blocked Bulgarian assets,
other than those owned by natural persons, held by the United States
as a result of wartime controls. The remaining 400,000 dollars was to be
paid in two installments, one in July 1964 and one in July 1965. In
addition, an Exchange of Notes accompanying the agreement provided
that Bulgaria would be deleted from the list of countries to whose
residents the United States prohibits the payment of funds by the
Treasury or other government agencies. This prohibition is embodied in
a Treasury Department circular 3 which provides that payments by
the United States Government or any of its agencies to residents of
proscribed countries must be deposited in a special Treasury account
rather than sent to the drawee. The regulation also provides that in the
event a country is removed from this list, claimants who can establish
their rights to withheld checks will receive them.
The removal of Bulgaria from the list permitted residents of
Bulgaria to file claims for all back payments to which they were entitled.
As of December 31, 1962, six months before the signing of the Bul-
garian Agreement, the total funds due Bulgarian residents held in the
special Treasury account amounted to 27,564 dollars.' 4 By the end of
1966, funds due Bulgarian residents had decreased by just over 21,000
dollars. We may assume this latter figure is the direct cost of this
concession by the United States to Bulgaria.
Further, it may be argued that these blocked Bulgarian funds were
due Bulgarian residents in any event. The act under which the Treasury
regulations are prescribed provides, inter alia:
[t] hat hereafter no check or warrant drawn against funds of the
United States, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall
be sent from the United States (including its Territories and
12. R. LLLICHr, supra note 7, at 10.
13. Treasury Dept. Circular No. 655, 31 C.F.R. §211 (2) (b) (1967) (list
originally drawn in 1941).
14. See Table 1. This figure may slightly understate the total due Bulgarian
residents by the Government as a whole because, after 1960, drawer agencies them-
selves were permitted to withhold payment if the check would be blocked, 31 C.F.R. §
211.5 (1967), but since the annual increments in blocked Bulgarian payments between
1956 and 1960 were small, see Table 1, the figure is not likely to be understated by
very much.
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possessions and the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands)
for delivery in a foreign country in any case in which the
Secretary of the Treasury determines that postal, transporta-
tion, or banking facilities in general, or local conditions in the
country to which such check or warrant is to be delivered, are
such that there is not a reasonable assurance that the payee
will actually receive such check or warrant and be able to
negotiate the same for full value.15
Thus, it was not the intention of the United States to withhold funds
from individuals entitled to them but rather to ensure that the funds were,
in fact, delivered to the proper recipient and that the recipient had full
use of the funds. It is, therefore, hard to argue that the release of these
funds is a cost properly assessable against this specific lump sum settle-
ment[.
An interesting side-effect of the removal of a country from the list
to which the Treasury circular applies is the likelihood of increased
migration to that country. This development is best illustrated by a
report in the New York Times that the United States has paid to Poland
about 2,500,000 dollars in social security payments each year since
1957.16 As of December 1956, the total funds due Polish residents, and
particularly social security claims, amounted to only 963,435 dollars;
the total distributed between that date and the end of 1966 amounted to
just under 300,000 dollars.' The only way, then, for payments to have
increased to the presumed level of 2,500,000 dollars per year is for
migration to have occurred between the United States and Poland.
Indeed, this seems like a reasonable explanation in light of the fact that
the same New York Times article reports that a pensioner with average
social security benefits receives one third of a Polish minister's salary,
even at the highly inflated official rate of exchange.
If migration took place to Poland, it is likely that there was some
migration to other Eastern European countries by social security re-
cipients. If only 100 pensioners had migrated to Bulgaria as a result of
the removal of that country from the list and the average benefit received
by each was about eighty dollars per month, the entire 400,000 dollars
due to be paid by Bulgaria would be obtained from social security
payments made anew or from released benefits paid residents of Bulgaria.
15. Pub. L. No. 828, § 1 (Oct. 9, 1940).
16. N. Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1968, p. 4, col. 4. The figure of $2,500,000 per year
is probably erroneous since inspection of Chart II shows that total United States
transfers to all of Eastern Europe did not amount to $2,500,000 in any year from
1957-1962. It is probable, however, that current payments are of approximately that
magnitude.
17. See Table 1.
892
ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS
There is an increase in the quantity of goods available to United
States residents as a result of this migration, however, even though the
United States finances the full amount of the lump sum settlement.
Pensioners may be considered to be non-producers; they consume some
residual of their past production or are supported for humanitarian
reasons. Given this fact, the goods which pensioners consume are net
deductions from the quantity of goods and services available to the
remainder of the economy.18 If the locus of consumption of a given
pensioner is moved from one country to another, the former has a net
gain in resources available to the remainder of its residents and the latter
has a net reduction. This is precisely analogous to the latter's having
exported to the former without requiring payment. This is the essence of
a real transfer. That Bulgaria uses dollars received by selling goods to
United States pensioners to pay her obligations to the United States is
immaterial. Bulgaria has earned these dollars by a process which is
virtually indistinguishable from exporting. Thus, in the case of Bulgaria,
since the total amount to be transferred was only 400,000 dollars, it is
likely that this amount, or more, was accounted for by increased pensions
to Bulgarian residents and that a full, real transfer of merchandise took
place.
The United States-Rumania Agreement is quite similar to the
Bulgarian settlement, except that the total United States claim amounted
to 24,526,370 dollars against which 22,026,370 dollars of blocked Ru-
manian property was offset. The remaining 2,500,000 dollars was to be
paid in five yearly installments of 500,000 dollars each. Rumania, too,
was to be dropped from the list of countries to which the provisions of
the Treasury circular apply. This concession resulted in payments to
Rumania of approximately 30,000 dollars in the six years from 1960 to
1966. But in the case of Rumania, once again it is likely that subsequent
to the conclusion of the 1960 agreement persons entitled to funds from the
United States migrated to that country in order to better their relative
levels of living. However, since the payments required to be made by
Rumania were greater than in the Bulgarian case, it is less likely that
receipts by migrants totally met the hard currency needs of Rumania
with respect to this agreement.
If this conclusion is true, the Rumanian Government, in order to
meet its needs for foreign exchange to buy Western goods and services,
would have needed to expand its exports by the amount of each yearly
18. In the absence of pensioners, however, the composition of goods produced by
the country may change, as well as the distribution of expenditures between investment
and consumption. These factors may have implications for the long run level of output,
but in the short run, and in terms of the static analysis here presented, they are ignored.
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payment-500,000 dollars, less transfers from the United States. It
would be able to do this only by offering goods sufficiently attractive to
other countries to cause them to expand their imports from Rumania.
These countries, in turn, would need to obtain dollars to pay for such
imports either by borrowing them or by increasing their own exports to
the United States. These loans or increases in imports by the United
States could be paid for with the net funds obtained from the Rumanian
settlement. The United States, as a result of these transactions, would
have been able to import more with no deterioration of its foreign
exchange position or no increase in foreign holdings of dollars."°
The Polish agreement with the United States is somewhat more
straightforward than the previous two; it calls for the payment by
Poland to the United States of 40,000,000 dollars in 2,000,000 dollar
yearly installments with no offsets. It is notable, however, that Poland
is the only one of the three countries to whom the United States has
given economic aid since entrance into a lump sum settlement agree-
ment." To the extent that this aid was impelled by the existence of the
lump sum agreement, as suggested earlier, real transfer of assets is
avoided. If the aid and the settlement agreement are unrelated, Poland
will export more (or import less) than she otherwise would have and
the United States will import more (or export less) than she would have
in the absence of the Polish payments. The United States will be able to
enjoy a higher real level of living due to her relatively higher imports.2
The three British agreements examined are all on the same pattern.
They provide that payment by the Eastern European countries of the
lump sum agreed upon shall be made in annual installments. The amount
of the installments is a percentage of the f.o.b. value of exports by the
paying country to the United Kingdom. In each of these settlements the
real transfer accompanying the money transfer is clear; effectively the
United Kingdom is reimbursed for some portion of her previous year's
imports. There is a movement of goods from the East European countries
to Britain at no charge.
There is the possibility, under the British pattern of settling claims,
that the debtor country may avoid the payment of her liabilities (or
unduly stretch them out over time) by decreasing her exports to Britain.
19. Although it is impossible to isolate the effects of such small yearly trans-
actions in the overall trade data, United States trade with Rumania, as well as with
Bulgaria and Poland, for the period 1955-1966 is shown in Table 3.
20. The amounts of such aid are shown in Table 5.
21. The removal of Poland from the list of countries affected by Treasury Circular
No. 655 occurred three years before the entrance by the United States and Poland
into the lump sum agreement of 1960, so it cannot be considered a direct concession
to Poland for the conclusion of the settlement, although it may have created an attractive
climate for the achievement of a satisfactory settlement.
ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS
But the persistent need of the communist countries for hard currencies
in order to purchase goods from the West and the fact that the effective
rebate on exports to the United Kingdom is a small proportion of the
value of these exports, combine to make this possibility unlikely. Rather,
just the opposite is probable.
The implied promise of a high level of trade is likely to give the
British a negotiating advantage in terms of the size of the money
settlement to be reached. But, since prices of exports from communist
countries are fixed by governmental fiat, a higher money settlement
could be accompanied by higher export prices so that the same real
transfer resulted. The size of the settlement payments compared with
the total exports of the countries involved, however, suggests that this
possibility, too, is improbable. Thus, the fact of real transfer under the
British system is direct and certain. Note also that British trade with
these three countries has not declined as a result of the lump sum
agreements; a decrease might be expected if the countries had behaved
in either of the ways suggested above.
The recent British devaluation, although it did not affect any of the
settlements examined for the purposes of this paper, suggests a danger in
negotiating settlements whose payments extend over a substantial period
of time. The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund
provide that a country may change the par value of its currency only in
the event of "fundamental disequilibrium."2 Although this term is no-
where defined and international economists differ as to the precise
definition, there is general agreement that devaluation is appropriate when
domestic prices have risen faster than world prices and caused a relatively
permanent deficit in international payments.23 Devaluation, then, is
evidence of the fact that domestic prices have risen; it causes a similar
increase in the prices of foreign commodities in terms of the devalued
currency.
A settlement agreement, whose value is expressed in absolute money
terms and whose payment extends over a period of time, eventually
may deliver, in terms of real resources, less than is expected by the
parties to the agreement. Such depreciation in the value of the agreement
will occur if the overall level of prices in the country in whose currency
the settlement is expressed has increasing prices, if that currency is
permitted to depreciate with respect to other currencies, or if the level of
prices for all countries increases over time. This is likely to be the fate
of the United States-Poland Agreement which extends over a period of
22. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, opened for
signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
23. Cf. ,W. SCA-MMELL, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY 53 (2d ed. 1961).
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twenty years. It is less likely to be true in the case of the British settle-
ments because of the tendency, at least recently, for world trade to in-
crease, and because the time horizon of British settlements is a function
of the level of bilateral trade.
The real transfer of goods and services induced by the United
States settlements formula seems, by and large, to be as certain, although
far less direct, as that induced by the British formula. To the extent that
the United States does not lose an advantage at the bargaining table by
specifying precisely the size of annual installments, there seems to be
little reason to prefer the British system of tying the size of annual
installments to the exports of the paying country. To the extent that any
advantage does exist, it probably lies with the latter course in view of
the bargaining power created by the implied promise by the United
Kingdom to maintain a high level of trade with the settling country.
The concessions which the United States offered to obtain the three
settlements examined, specifically the aid granted Poland and the exemp-
tion from the provisions of the Treasury circular granted Bulgaria and
Rumania, provide an easily tapped supply of foreign exchange with
which these countries can meet their obligations under the agreements:
the wheat shipped Poland released funds which she would otherwise
have needed to spend for imports and the payments to pensioners in
Bulgaria and Rumania, including immigrants to those countries, pro-
vided funds directly. Funds provided by these concessions are in addition
to the funds obtained by the various countries through exports which,
under the British formula, are the only funds from which claims can be
paid. The United States, then, by the granting of a concession, made
the payment of these three settlements easier than they otherwise might
have been.
TABLE I
Proceeds of Withheld Foreign Checks
Balances in Treasury Account 2ox6o48 by Country and Date24
Bulgaria Poland Rumania
December 31, 1956 $23,233 $963,436 $55,310
December 31, 1958 24,615 751,900 56,728
June 30, 1959 24,932 726,233 58,366
June 30, 1960 25,565 689,164 59,068
December 31, 1960 25,882 683,041 49,404
December 31, 1961 26,772 673,192 35,954
December 31, 1962 27,565 671,599 35,760
December 31, 1963 26,093 669,783 35,014
December 31, 1964 13,897 668,783 35,009
December 31, 1966 6,211 664,139 28,791
24. United States Treasury Department.
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TABLE II
United States Government Pensions and Other Transfers
to Eastern Europe (millions of dollars)25
1955 195627 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Transfers2 6 X 18 X 2 X 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
TABLE III
United States Trade with Bulgaria
(millions of dollars)2 8
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Exports
Imports
.1 - - .1 .8 -
.4 .4 .5 .7 1.0 .8
- - .1 4.8 3.6 3.1
1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.7 2.1
Balance -.3 .-4 -.5 -.6 -.2 -.8 -1.2 -1.0 -1.1 3.6 1.9 1.0
United States Trade with Poland
Exports 3.1 3.7 73.1 105.2 74.7 142.8 74.4 94.7 108.9 138.0 35.4 49.8
Imports 26.6 27.4 30.0 29.7 31.8 38.1 40.8 46.0 43.1 542 65.9 73.8
Balance -23.5 -23.7 43.1 75.5 32.9 104.7 33.6 48.7 65.8 83.8 -30.5 -24.0
United States Trade with Rumania
Exports .2 .5 1.0 .9 1.8 1.2 1.2 .7 1.2 5.2 6.4 23.6
Imports .3 .4 .5 .4 1.2 1.4 1.2 .5 .8 1.3 1.8 4.1
Balance -.1 .1 .5 .5 .6 -.2 - .2 .4 3.9 4.6 19.5
TABLE IV
United Kingdom Trade with Bulgaria
(millions of dollars)29
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Exports 3.5 3.2 2.6 1.5 6.3 7.8 5.3 3.5 6.0 7.8 10.8 20.8
Imports 1.0 2.4 1.9 3.3 4.4 6.3 9.2 9.4 10.2 12.0 15.1 17.4
Balance 2.5 .8 .7 -1.8 1.9 1.5 -3.9 -5.9 -4.2 -4.2 -4.3 3.4
United Kingdom Trade with Poland
Exports 19.5 28.8 29.7 32.9 46.4 41.0 65.1 92.3 78.6 69.5 70.6 101.6
Imports 82.3 83.8 66.2 72.9 91.5 101.0 103.3 107.8 112.5 134.8 135.8 150.3
Balance -62.8 -55.0 -36.5 -40.0 -45.1 -60.0 -38.2 -15.5 -33.9 -65.3 -65.2 -48.7
United Kingdom Trade with Rumania
Exports 8.4 7.0 9.2 4.4 6.6 11.9 41.4 25.6 33.3 23.5 27.1 29.9
Imports 9.8 5.1 2.8 5.8 6.0 11.1 17.0 19.8 20.8 25.0 31.4 42.5
Balance -1.4 1.9 6.4 -1.4 .6 .8 24.4 5.8 12.5 -1.5 -4.3 -12.6
25. Survey of Current Business, various issues.
26. X indicates payments less than 500,000 dollars.
27. Payment from Eastern Europe to the United States.
28. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, various issues.
29. Id.
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TABLE V
United States Aid to Poland
(millions of dollars)30
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Aide' -5 -6 56 99 66 127 57 61 48 52 -6 -10
30. Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years.
31. A minus sign indicates that the net payment (or repayment) is from Poland
to the United States.
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